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A Glass Half Empty: Drinking Water 
in First Nations Communities
Sarah N. Morales1
Introduction
Water is an essential part of life, especially for First Nations citizens as it contrib-
utes not only to their physical survival but their cultural survival as well. Virtually 
all rights of Aboriginal peoples depend on a viable and suffi cient quantity and 
quality of water. For example, water is essential to the Aboriginal rights to fi sh, 
hunt, and trap. Water is also essential as a means of transportation for many 
Aboriginal people. In fact, the absolute necessity of water to the lives of Aborigi-
nal people has made it a signifi cant part of their spiritual and cultural existence 
as well. It is for these main reasons that many Aboriginal leaders advocate the 
recognition of an Aboriginal right to govern this resource within their traditional 
territories.
All communities rely on sources of potable water for drinking and household 
use. Native communities that manage their own water systems may face specifi c 
problems, as alternative sources of potable water may not be available. The 
production and delivery of potable water is often taken for granted until problems 
occur, sometimes with tragic consequences. After incidents in Walkerton, Ontario, 
in 2000, North Battleford, Saskatchewan, in 2001, and more recently in the First 
Nations community of Kashechewan, Ontario, in 2005, improving the safety 
of drinking water has become a priority in Canada, especially in First Nation 
communities.2 Providing safe drinking water involves complex technical, human, 
fi nancial, and regulatory factors. In First Nations communities, the relationship 
between the federal government and First Nations, and the unique situation of 
each First Nation add to this complexity.
Federal programs and funding related to drinking water on reserves are based 
on government policy adopted in the 1960s and 1970s, and parliamentary appro-
priations. The objective of the government policy is to ensure that people living 
on-reserve attain a comparable level of health and have access to water facilities 
comparable to those of other Canadians living in communities of similar size and 
location. However, these very government policies often prevent this objective 
from being attained. This is mainly due to the fact that these policies lack input 
from Aboriginal communities and fail to take into consideration the unique 
circumstances and issues that these communities face. Until a regulatory regime 
which takes Aboriginal concerns and values into consideration is in place, INAC 
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and Health Canada cannot ensure that First Nations people living on-reserve have 
access to safe drinking water.
This paper fi rst explores the current federal policy adopted by government 
to deal with the issue of safe drinking water in First Nations communities, and 
the insuffi ciencies of this policy. Secondly, it suggests two working approaches 
to water quality in these communities. The fi rst is the creation of a co-manage-
ment regime between the federal government and First Nations governments. The 
second is a recognition of an Aboriginal right to govern the water resources within 
their traditional territory.3 
Unique Susceptibility of First Nations Communities 
and Their Members to Pollutants
The economic condition and health status of Aboriginal peoples are among the 
lowest of any ethnic or minority group in Canada. Poverty, poor health, and more 
limited access to health care all make Aboriginal Canadians more susceptible 
to adverse impacts from pollution.4 Although fi duciary duties, treaties, and the 
Indian Act obligate the federal government to provide health-related services to 
First Nations, shamefully, government departments responsible for these services 
have a history of being grossly under-funded and under-staffed.
Traditional, cultural, and subsistence uses of, and strong dependencies on, 
natural resources such as water make First Nations especially susceptible to 
adverse health affects from pollution. In many cases, First Nations “have greater 
exposure risks than the general population as a result of their dietary practices and 
unique cultures that embrace the environment.”5 Hunting, gathering, and fi shing 
are necessary not only for survival, but also for maintaining the cultural, social, 
spiritual, and economic aspects of Aboriginal communities. Frequently, the right 
to engage in gathering, hunting, and fi shing is legally protected by treaty. First 
Nations and their members also use water, plants, and animals in religious, tradi-
tional, and cultural ceremonies and practices. When pollutants contaminate the 
air, water, soil, plants, and animals, these pollutants will likely accumulate in the 
people through consumption, ingestion, contact and inhalation.6
A recent example of the tragedy that can occur when pollutants go unchecked 
occured in the Aboriginal community of Kashechewan. Kashechewan’s water 
treatment plant, funded in 1995 by Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC), 
was designed by out-of-town consultants. It was placed downstream from an 
existing sewage lagoon. This essentially means that contaminants fl ow past the 
intake pipe that feeds raw water into the complex system to be treated for drinking. 
In 2004, Indian Affairs spent $500,000 for upgrades, but did not move the intake 
pipe.7 Furthermore, Band leaders say that they never received proper training, or 
enough funding to run the plant, which requires 24-hour maintenance.8 In late 
October 2005, the evacuation of more than 1,000 community members began as 
the situation descended into crisis when federal offi cials warned of high E. coli 
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levels in tap water. Almost all of these residents were evacuated due to scabies, 
impetigo and other health-related problems from E. coli-laced water.
Unfortunately, the threat of such contamination is not only limited to the health 
of Aboriginal communities, but extends also to the health and well-being of future 
generations. Several studies have shown that children are particularly susceptible 
to the effects of pollution. For example, industry has devastated the traditional 
lifestyle of the Mohawk community on the Akwesasne reservation. Core samples 
of the St. Lawrence River bottom have found over 6,000 ppm of polychlorinated 
biphenyls (“PCBs”).9 However, while the PCB concentrations in the breast milk 
of Mohawk women decreased over time, their infants’ urine PCB levels were ten 
times higher than that of their mothers.10 
Situations such as these indicate that oftentimes it is the people who are most 
at risk who should be entitled to determine the relevant environmental standards 
that will govern their resources. However, as the next section will demonstrate, 
Aboriginal peoples have little decision-making authority under the current federal 
policy governing drinking water quality on reserve lands.
Current Jurisdictional Responsibilities and Policy 
Over Water Quality
It is current government policy that the management of potable drinking water and 
waste water on First Nation reserves, from source to tap, is a shared responsibility 
between First Nations and the federal government. First Nations Band councils, 
INAC (advised by Environment Canada), and Health Canada provide programs 
and services that are meant to ensure safe, clean, and secure water on reserves. 
Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) has the primary authority for fulfi ll-
ing the federal government’s constitutional, treaty, political, and legal responsibil-
ities for First Nations. Since the early 1960s, the department has provided support 
to assist individuals living on-reserve in accessing basic infrastructure services, 
i.e. water, waste water treatment, roads, bridges, schools etc.11 In addition, the 
department is authorized to provide funding assistance to operate and maintain 
these assets. INAC’s primary role today is satisfi ed through the provision of 
funding and advisory activities.12
INAC funding for infrastructure services is provided through a variety of 
funding arrangements. These funding arrangements include terms and conditions, 
and reporting requirements that INAC uses to ensure that First Nations meet 
program requirements. For example, subject to approval, based in part upon a 
review of the First Nation’s fi nancial management track record, and the availabil-
ity of funds, fi nances are provided to reserve communities for capital construc-
tion and upgrading, operation and maintenance, and water and waste water plants 
through INAC’s Capital Facilities and Maintenance Program. However, INAC’s 
funding to subsidize the operation and maintenance of water treatment and distri-
bution systems is in accordance with an established formula. The remaining 
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funding is to be provided locally from user fees or other revenue sources.13 INAC 
also provides funding to First Nations to share services, such as water, with neigh-
boring municipalities through municipal-type agreements when this is a cost-
effective and practical solution.
Health Canada’s general mandate regarding the protection of public health is 
found in the Department of Health Act,14 1996. This legislation delineates the 
health matters in which the Minister may act, while respecting provincial jurisdic-
tion. These matters include, but are not limited to, investigations and research into 
public health, monitoring of diseases, providing public-health information, estab-
lishing safety standards for consumer products, and co-operating with provincial 
authorities to coordinate efforts to preserve and improve public health.15
Health Canada, in collaboration with INAC, is responsible for ensuring safe 
drinking water in First Nation communities south of 60˚. As part of the Environ-
mental Health Program, and through the Drinking Water Safety Program, Health 
Canada is responsible for working with First Nations to monitor drinking water 
quality in distribution systems with fi ve or more connections and cisterns in First 
Nation communities. Water quality sampling, testing, and interpretations are to 
be done according to the Guidelines for Canadian Drinking Water Quality, Sixth 
Edition, Health Canada. 
Environment Canada’s main responsibility in regards to safe drinking water in 
First Nations communities is with respect to waste water management. Environ-
ment Canada provides advice and technical expertise to INAC on assessments 
under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, and on requirements related 
to the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, and the Fisheries Act. Envi-
ronment Canada develops standards, guidelines and/or protocols for waste water 
systems on federal and Aboriginal lands, including effl uent limits.
INAC policy states that on-reserve waste water treatment systems are to be 
designed and operated in such a way that effl uent quality meets the requirements of 
the latest edition of the Guidelines for Effl uent Quality and Waste water Treatment 
at Federal Establishments, established by Environment Canada, and other appli-
cable provincial/territorial requirements, if these are stricter.16 It is important to 
note that First Nations values and ideas are not taken into consideration under this 
current government policy.
Under current government policy, First Nations are responsible for ensuring 
that water and waste water systems are planned, designed, constructed, and main-
tained and operated according to funding agreement conditions.17 First Nations 
are legally required to comply with all program and fi nancial terms and conditions 
in their funding agreements. However, there is very little room for First Nations to 
vary the structure of these agreements to meet local needs and concerns.
All proposed capital projects for water and waste water systems, funded by 
INAC, must comply with the terms and conditions of the funding agreement 
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under the Capital Facilities and Maintenance Program. For all INAC-funded 
capital projects, First Nations are responsible for:
Project identifi cation;
Feasibility (engineering) studies;
Environmental assessments;
Project design;
Project construction;
Plant classifi cation; and
Commissioning.18
First Nations are required to:
Follow INAC’s tendering policy;
Conduct regular site inspections;
Provide construction and fi nancial progress reports;
Submit a project completion report;
Secure “as build” drawings for future reference; and
Develop site-specifi c maintenance management plans.19
First Nations require INAC approvals for all capital project components from 
the feasibility stage to the commissioning stage as per INAC policy.
Under current government policy, First Nations must follow INACs and Health 
Canada’s monitoring and inspection regimes. All sampling and testing procedures 
performed during monitoring activities must be carried out as defi ned in the moni-
toring and inspection regime, including the use of accredited laboratories. If a 
First Nation does not follow this regime, and depending on the level of risk to 
health, gradual compliance assurance will be started by INAC.20 This will include 
things such as written warnings; holdbacks from “non-essential” funding; and 
ultimately, third-party management.
INAC provides a funding subsidy to First Nations for the operations and main-
tenance (O&M) of water and waste water facilities on reserves. First Nations 
Chief and Council are responsible for assuming partial fi nancial responsibility for 
the remaining funding through user fees and/or other revenue sources. However, 
funding for O&M must be used for the purposes described in the funding agree-
ments, and First Nations are responsible for demonstrating that these funds were 
spent on INAC’s intended purposes, regardless of what the First Nation views to 
be an intended purpose.
As demonstrated by this policy model, currently First Nations have very little 
fl exibility in creating standards or regulations to ensure high water quality in their 
communities. Under section 81(1) of the Indian Act,21 a Band council is given 
the power to make by-laws for a number of different purposes. The provision of 
section 81(1) which could give a Band council jurisdiction over water quality 
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management is section 81(1)(l)—the construction and regulation of the use of 
public wells, cisterns, reservoirs, and other water supplies. 
However, bylaws can be disallowed by the Minister of Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development. Once passed, a bylaw must be forwarded to the Minister, 
and it automatically comes into force after forty days unless it is disallowed 
[s. 82(2)]. A further problem, discussed below, is that the by laws are limited in 
their geographic scope. In other words, by laws only apply on the reserve. Even if 
a water body or fi shery is near the reserve and affects a Band’s on-reserve water 
quality, the bylaw-making power is strictly confi ned to the physical boundaries 
of the reserve. Another limitation is that Band Councils do not have the power to 
make bylaws in relation to “navigable” rivers, even if a river is physically on the 
reserve.
Another limitation is that the bylaw-making power of Band councils is largely 
restricted to regulatory and administrative matters. This restriction may prevent the 
adoption of a proper water management scheme on reserve lands. For example, it 
is doubtful whether a Band bylaw which attempted to say that all waters are in the 
control of a Band would be valid. This would be seen as an illegal expropriation.
As a result, drinking water quality on reserves is governed by current federal 
policy. However, currently there is no regulatory regime in place to deal with this 
resource. Therefore, funding arrangements seem to play a large role in dictating 
water quality standards and requirements. As the next section will demonstrate, 
this policy model creates signifi cant issues in the provision of safe drinking water 
on reserves.
Issues with the Current Policy Model
Regulatory Gap for Drinking Water on Reserves
In its recent report, the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Devel-
opment found that INAC, Health Canada, and First Nations do not operate under 
a regulatory regime as most provinces do. There is no effective legislative base 
for regulating potable water on reserves. The operative federal standards, set out 
in the Guidelines for Canadian Drinking Water Quality, are just that—guidelines 
with no legislative teeth. Instead, INAC and Health Canada use funding arrange-
ments with First Nations, and administrative documents as the means to set and 
enforce requirements for water quality and safety.
INAC attempts to fi ll this “regulatory gap” by referring to provincial legisla-
tion and regulation in its policies and administrative guidelines, and in funding 
arrangements with First Nations. However, the Report of the Commissioner of the 
Environment and Sustainable Development (“the Report”) found that important 
elements covered in most provincial regulatory regimes are missing from the 
guidelines and funding arrangements.22 These include the approval and licensing 
of water treatment plants, ongoing monitoring, public reporting requirements, and 
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compliance and enforcements mechanisms. In practice, this means, for example, 
that where a province requires water treatment plants to be licensed or certifi ed, 
the plants located in First Nations communities face no such regulation from the 
provinces.
The Report also found that INAC administrative guidelines are not consis-
tently implemented.23 These guidelines require, among other things, that new 
water systems meet provincial regulations, except where they are less stringent 
than those of the federal government. Department offi cials informed the Commis-
sioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development that they do not feel 
obliged to comply fully with or enforce provincial regulations.24 They also stated 
that they do not have the human resources and capacity that the provinces have to 
support and enforce them.25
INAC is drafting new administrative guidelines for drinking water systems in 
First Nations communities as a component of the First Nations Water Manage-
ment Strategy. However, the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable 
Development reviewed the document, and found that it falls short of providing an 
effective regulatory regime because the guidelines apply only to INAC offi cials.26 
Furthermore, the Report found that it will not be enforceable through legislation 
or regulations, and how it will apply to First Nations remains unclear.27
Most frequently, INAC relies on funding arrangements with First Nations to 
defi ne drinking water requirements on reserve lands. However, the language in 
the arrangements is general and does not specifi cally refer to water systems.28 In 
2001, in a submission to the Walkerton Inquiry, the Chiefs of Ontario stated: “First 
Nations, their consultants, and federal offi cials are left to discern the applicable 
standards from vague and confl icting language in funding conditions, guidelines 
and manuals.”29 Unfortunately, even with the First Nations Water Management 
Strategy, this situation has not changed signifi cantly.
Funding arrangements between INAC and First Nations require First Nations 
to adhere to all applicable codes and standards, and preserve health and safety. 
However, it is not clear whether and how the First Nations are to incorporate all 
the elements found in provincial legislation and regulations in the management 
of their drinking water. The Chiefs of Ontario also commented, in a submission 
to the Walkerton Inquiry, that “The question of ‘which law applies’ is inherently 
uncertain for most activities that take place on reserves because of the judicially 
undefi ned scope of Aboriginal rights and the vague and subjective tests which 
govern the division of powers impacting on ‘Indianness.’ ”30
Currently, there is no legislation requiring that drinking water quality and 
safety in First Nations communities be monitored. More importantly, there is no 
First Nations–specifi c legislation on water quality of environmental standards in 
Canada. It is Health Canada’s policy that it has no statutory- or regulatory-based 
enforcement or inspection powers for water quality on reserves.31 Therefore, 
departmental staff members are not legally empowered to ensure that all required 
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tests are carried out. In addition, First Nations are not legally empowered to test 
their drinking water. Consequently, residents in First Nation communities do not 
benefi t from testing practices comparable to those in non-reserve communities.
Under the Drinking Water Safety Program, Health Canada enters into funding 
arrangements with most First Nations, or contracts with individuals, to test 
drinking water as recommended under the Guidelines for Canadian Drinking 
Water Quality. However, under these arrangements, the only consequence for 
failing to carry out tests is that funds are withheld.32
Water Systems Do Not Meet All Applicable Codes and Standards
The Report of the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Develop-
ment found that INAC has no comprehensive list of codes and standards applica-
ble to the design and construction of water systems.33 Codes and standards are set 
out in various documents, funding arrangements, administrative documents, and 
project briefs. In these documents, the defi nitions of codes and standards range 
from the requirement to meet “all applicable codes and standards” to references to 
either a general or specifi c list of codes and standards.34 It is unclear which defi ni-
tions are applicable and will be applied to a given project.
This issue can have consequences for the quality or safety of drinking water. 
INAC’s 2001 assessment of water systems found many design or construction 
faults. In fact, these faults explain a portion of the 75% of water systems that were 
classifi ed as risky.35 As history has demonstrated, these defi ciencies can result in 
risks to operator safety, failure to achieve the treatment performance, or inability 
to produce the expected water quantity.
Under the First Nations Water Management Strategy, INAC has committed to 
ensuring that all water systems on reserves are built to standards. It has developed 
draft administrative guidelines to defi ne it own requirements. In their current 
form, these guidelines clarify some requirements, but it is not clear how First 
Nations will implement them.36
Water Testing is Inconsistent
It is well known that drinking water needs to be tested regularly as a fi nal check 
on the safety of the supply chain for drinking water, and to protect public health. 
However, regular tests of drinking water are not carried out in most First Nation 
reserve communities.37
Although Health Canada’s overall target is to reach the testing frequency 
recommended in the Guidelines for Canadian Drinking Water Quality by 2008, 
as late as November 2005, the department had yet to develop a comprehensive 
plan, with specifi c target dates, to meet this overall target.38 In addition, it does 
not ensure that First Nations test their drinking water as required in the funding 
arrangements, contracts and Health Canada procedure manual.39 Although Health 
Canada does not provide funds when tests are not carried out, the absence of tests 
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hampers Health Canada’s and First Nations’ ability to detect potential water quality 
problems and make timely and informed decisions to deal with these issues. 
As previously stated, Health Canada’s policy is that it has only an advisory role 
to First Nations when tests show that the drinking water is not safe to drink. At its 
discretion, the Department may recommend that a First Nation issue a boil-water 
advisory to users. According to Health Canada, First Nations have the authority 
to put in place and lift advisories, and they have the responsibility, with assistance 
from INAC, Health Canada, tribal councils, and other support organizations, to 
correct the underlying causes. However, some advisories have been in place for 
many years.40
Support and Capacity Development is Inadequate
The Report of the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Develop-
ment found that INAC’s programs are limited in scope, and that the technical help 
available to First Nations to support and develop their capacity to provide safe 
drinking water is fragmented.41 The report identifi ed weaknesses in three main 
areas: operators, funding, and information and monitoring.
Operators
Most water treatment plant operators in First Nations communities do not posses 
the knowledge and skills required to operate their plant safely. The 2001 assess-
ment found that approximately 10% of the operators on reserves met the certi-
fi cation requirements of their respective province.42 Under the First Nations 
Water Management Strategy, INAC introduced a requirement that all on-reserve 
operators be certifi ed to the level of complexity of their water treatment plant, in 
accordance with the rules applicable in their province. The target is to certify all 
operators or ensure that uncertifi ed operators are directly supervised by a certifi ed 
operator by 2006.
INAC’s statistics indicate that at the end of March 2005, about 40% of the 
operators were certifi ed.43 However, for one region included in these statistics, 
the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development found that 
although many of the operators were trained and had passed exams, they were not 
certifi ed.44 In addition, the statistics do not indicate if the operators are certifi ed 
to the level of complexity of their plants. Furthermore, as provincial certifi ca-
tion and training requirements are becoming more stringent, many First Nations 
operators have diffi culty meeting educational and experience requirements. Also, 
for more complex water treatment plants, a minimum number of years of experi-
ence operating such a facility under appropriate supervision is required before 
certifi cation. 
As previously stated, the main support available to operators comes from the 
Circuit Rider Training Program funded by INAC in all regions. However, this 
type of support and training is not mandatory or accessible to all First Nations.45 
In addition, INAC does not require a training plan to be in place.46 Also, a lot of 
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the trainer’s time is spent resolving immediate technical problems rather than 
providing training.47 In summary, the Report indicates that there is a high prob-
ability that the certifi cation target will not be met.48
Funding
INAC does not use a consistent method to fund First Nations for the operation 
and maintenance (O&M) of their water systems. Its policy is to allocate O&M 
funds on the basis of a formula. The amount allocated to each First Nation should 
cover 80% of the estimated O&M costs of drinking water systems. However, the 
formula has not been updated for many years. In some regions, the Department 
does not use the formula, and provides some First Nations with 80% of their 
actual O&M costs if they can provide suffi cient evidence of paying these costs.49
Under the First Nations Water Management Strategy, INAC is implement-
ing a new method to estimate O&M costs and allocate funds. This method takes 
into account the characteristics of each water system, and as a result, many First 
Nations are eligible for additional funding. However, it is not clear whether this 
method will apply to all First Nations, or if actual costs will continue to be paid 
in some cases.50
INAC does not know whether all funds for operation and maintenance are used 
for this purpose. Under the applicable funding conditions, First Nations have the 
fl exibility to use O&M funds for other purposes, and INAC has limited assurance 
that they are used for the intended purpose. At this time, it is not clear whether 
INAC will make funding conditions uniform under the First Nations Water 
Management Strategy, and how it will obtain assurances that the funds are being 
used as intended.
Another issue related to operation and maintenance funding of water systems is 
based on the fact that under INAC’s O&M guidelines, First Nations are expected 
to cover 20% of the O&M costs of water systems through user fees or other 
sources. In practice, few First Nations collect user fees.51 Moreover, INAC does 
not take into consideration whether First Nations have other resources to meet this 
requirement, and has no means to enforce it.52
Information and Monitoring
INAC has limited information on whether First Nations meet the conditions of 
their funding arrangements, and whether its programs and funding result in safe 
drinking water. To monitor the state of water systems, INAC requires First Nations 
to provide information annually on their O&M plans and activities, and the results 
of an inspection of the condition of their water systems every three to fi ve years.
However, in many cases, INAC does not know whether regular maintenance 
identifi ed by First Nations was completed, or whether urgent maintenance or 
repair projects are needed.53 Some reports requested by INAC are not provided 
by all First Nations, even though they would be useful to both INAC and the First 
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Nations. For example, First Nations are supposed to have maintenance manage-
ment plans in place for their water systems. However, INAC does not require 
evidence that these plans are in place and used.54 In addition, regions are supposed 
to ensure that annual maintenance inspections are completed. These are not being 
done systematically.55 Moreover, periodic inspections are not always carried out 
when due, and some inspection reports provided by First Nations contain poor-
quality information.56 As a result, the information system in place to record the 
results of water system inspections is not reliable.
As a result of their funding arrangements, when defi ciencies in a water system 
are noted in a report to INAC, First Nations are responsible for correcting them. 
However, there is no effective means to inform INAC that the defi ciencies are 
corrected, and the Department has limited means to ensure that a First Nation 
has addressed the defi ciencies. Furthermore, INAC cannot threaten to withdraw 
O&M funding to facilitate a correction because drinking water is an essential 
service.57 Under the First Nations Water Management Strategy, INAC has under-
taken a review of its information needs and data collection processes for drinking 
water, but it is yet to be seen whether this review will be successful and what 
actions will result from it.
Co-management as a Solution
As the previous section has demonstrated, signifi cant regulatory changes need 
to be made in order to ensure that Aboriginal communities are receiving good 
quality water. However, if these changes are to be effective, they must be created 
and implemented with the participation and support of the Aboriginal communi-
ties which they affect. In recent decades, there has been considerable attention 
paid to co-management as an important mechanism for the effective management 
of natural resources. The term “co-management” refers to a wide range of orga-
nizational arrangements, functions, and levels of power-sharing. It encompasses 
everything from relatively simple arrangements with government managers 
sharing power with users over limited resources and geographic areas, to legis-
lated arrangements evolving from Aboriginal self-government negotiations.58 As 
a result, this paper adopts Notzke’s general defi nition: “ ‘Co-management’ broadly 
refers to the sharing of power and responsibility between government and local 
resource users. This is achieved by various levels of integration of local and state 
level management systems.”59
Aboriginal support for a co-management role over water and other natural 
resources is aimed at the recognition and integration of Aboriginal concerns, 
Aboriginal rights, and Aboriginal expertise into the management and policy 
arenas concerning water resources. Aboriginal governments argue that the era 
of paternalistic, unilateral decision-making by the federal government is over, 
super-ceded by the more forward-looking policy of encouraging the exercise of 
Aboriginal rights and Aboriginal self-determination. Co-management is one 
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approach that fi ts within this era of recognition and reconciliation of Aboriginal 
rights with the rights of the Canadian population at large.
Integration of First Nations as co-managers provides an effective means of 
addressing some of the complex issues discussed above concerning the provision 
of safe drinking water to Aboriginal communities in Canada. Integration of tribes 
as co-managers moves the major parties closer to developing more effective 
measures to deal with the diffi cult scientifi c and policy issues involved with water 
quality. Co-management provides a unique opportunity for the application of 
Aboriginal traditional ecological knowledge to increasingly complex problems 
that require a broader and deeper understanding of the phenomena at issue.60 As 
previously stated, often times it is the community most affected by an issue which 
is in the best position to come up with the most effective and appropriate means 
to deal with the problem.
The 1987 amendments to the United States’ Clean Water Act61 demonstrate 
an example of one of the highest forms of co-management—one that has been 
enshrined in federal legislation. The 1987 amendments to the Clean Water Act 
provide the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) with the authority to approve 
a tribe for treatment as a state for certain purposes enumerated in the act.62 One 
of the enumerated sections for which tribes may seek approval is Section 303, 
the water quality standard provision of the act. Section 303 permits a state, or a 
tribe treated as a state, to establish water quality standards for the water resources 
within the state’s or the tribe’s governmental jurisdiction. However, a tribe must 
fi rst demonstrate four categories of authority and capability in order to be treated 
as a state by the EPA. First, the tribe must be one that is recognized by the Depart-
ment of the Interior.63 Second, the tribe must have a governing body carrying out 
substantial governmental duties and powers.64 Third, the functions to be exercised 
must concern the management and protection of the water resources which are 
held by an Indian tribe, held in trust by the United States for Indians, held by 
a member of an Indian tribe subject to a restriction, or otherwise within the 
borders of an Indian reservation.65 Finally, the tribe must show that it is reason-
ably expected to be capable, in the Administrator’s judgment, of carrying out the 
functions to be exercised.66
Water quality standards establish the desired ambient nature of a water body.67 
Under this co-management system, the appropriate state or tribal authority estab-
lishes designated benefi cial uses for the water resources under its jurisdiction, then 
develops narrative and numerical criteria to protect the designated uses.68 Each set 
of standards must contain an anti-degradation clause, intended to prohibit further 
polluting of the water.69
Once established and approved, these water quality standards apply to lakes, 
rivers and streams, or portions thereof. If there is a discharge into a segment of the 
water body, the required permit issued to the discharger must nominally meet any 
applicable water quality standards.70 A permit cannot be issued if the discharge 
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would violate these standards.71 When drafting a permit, the EPA seeks certifi ca-
tion from the state or from a tribe that the limitations in the proposed permit will 
not violate existing water quality standards.72 Moreover, a discharge permit must 
be conditioned so as not to violate downstream stands.73
These aspects of tribal power under the Clean Water Act have been upheld by 
United States courts. For instance, in New Mexico, the Isleta Pueblo, an Indian 
tribe downstream from the City of Albuquerque on the Rio Grande, was granted 
Clean Water Act tribes-as-states status, and adopted water quality standards more 
stringent than those of the state of New Mexico.74 Albuquerque challenged the 
EPA’s approval and subsequent enforcement of those standards—which included 
requiring changes to Albuquerque’s National Pollution Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES) permit for an upstream waste water treatment facility—on a 
variety of grounds, including challenging the authority of EPA to implement more 
stringent tribal standards against non-Indian entities off-reservation.75 The court 
upheld the EPA’s application of the tribe’s standards, expressly holding that the 
Isleta Pueblo’s right to adopt water quality standards more stringent than those of 
an upstream state was rooted not just in the Clean Water Act, but also in the tribe’s 
“inherent sovereignty.”76
There is no one-size-fi ts-all approach to co-management. Each First Nation, 
as a unique, self-determining community, has developed its own institu-
tions, resources, and procedures. Each First Nation’s rights are based on legal 
documents, i.e. treaties, and histories specifi c to that community. Furthermore, the 
local situation within which each First Nation is embedded is unique, with partic-
ularized landscapes, resource issues, and user groups. Therefore, the means by 
which a particular First Nation can be integrated into a decision-making process 
for water and waterways needs to be developed on a First Nation–specifi c basis.
Nonetheless, there are some fundamental, overarching principles that can 
govern each co-management agreement regarding water quality. First, the role 
that First Nation governments play in a co-management regime must be developed 
within a framework that recognizes that they are in fact governments, accountable 
for the health and welfare of their membership. Such recognition can serve to 
ensure the protection of the Aboriginal interest in resources critical to the long-
term economic security, political integrity, and health and well-being of their 
communities.
Second, First Nations should be made an integral part of the decision-making 
process. The very term co-management means that First Nations participate in 
the decision-making process. First Nations should be sitting at the table from 
the earliest stages of policy formulation, problem identifi cation, and development 
of solutions to water quality. In order to effectively deal with the water quality 
issues within Aboriginal communities, their leaders or representatives need to be 
included at the very beginning of the decision-making process. Such front loading 
of First Nation participation not only reduces the potential for long-term, disruptive 
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confl ict over policies and proposed solution, but it also facilitates the incorpora-
tion of critical information and technical expertise possessed by the Aboriginal 
communities.
Third, the input provided by tribes should be considered expert information, 
and given a certain degree of deference. Traditional Aboriginal knowledge of 
ecological systems, developed from generations of interaction with the environ-
ment, infl uences tribal beliefs regarding resource use and management.77 Aborigi-
nal environmental knowledge is integrated with tribal religious beliefs and world 
view in many different ways.78 While current economic, social, and political 
factors affect Aboriginal world views,79 there is a certain consistency of tradi-
tional environmental knowledge infl uencing First Nation environmental decision-
making.80 A water resource co-management approach is an important tool because 
it offers First Nations the opportunity to integrate traditional Aboriginal values 
and knowledge with contemporary resource management policies.
Fourth, a co-management system should incorporate mechanisms for resolving 
disputes, and differences in opinion and approach among the co-managing 
parties. As diverse stakeholders with interests and perspectives that might be at 
odds, the parties to a co-management regime must develop methods and mecha-
nisms to deal with disputes. Unilateral decision-making by one party upsets the 
power balance between the co-managing powers. One useful model for integrated 
decision-making and dispute resolution is the Columbia River Fisheries Manage-
ment Plan (CRFMP), a complex arrangement for the management of Indian and 
non-Indian fi sheries on the Columbia River that involves four Indian tribes, three 
states and two federal agencies. The CRFMP contains detailed provisions for 
dispute resolution among the parties, recognizing the likelihood of disagreement 
on technical and policy matters.81 The CRFMP provides for an internal dispute 
resolution mechanism through which policy or technical disputes are brought 
before the Policy Committee, a body comprised of representatives appointed by 
each party, and charged with the task of “facilitating cooperative action by the 
Parties,”82 Moreover, the CRFMP remains under the continuing jurisdiction of the 
federal district court for Oregon, and a special magistrate is available to hear and 
resolve disputes between the parties that cannot be resolved through the internal 
dispute resolution process.83
Though a co-management regime is not without its faults, a co-management 
regime for water resources offers several advantages to First Nations, including 
the opportunity to participate in and infl uence the development of water quality 
policies that affect them. Once First Nation governments gain “a seat at the 
table,” they have the opportunity to integrate Aboriginal beliefs and management 
practices with mainstream policies on water quality. At the same time, co-manage-
ment approaches also help water quality policymakers learn about the values, 
culture and way of life of Aboriginal people. This is important because it helps 
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government policymakers understand traditional Aboriginal views, and avoid 
potential disputes and tragedies, such as the recent incident at Kashechewan.
Self-governance as a Solution
Though co-management is a desirable objective for First Nation governments, 
arguably many leaders are advocating for a system of self-governance to rectify 
issues in their communities, such as water quality. A defi nition of Aboriginal “self-
government” is diffi cult to formulate, as the term has been used to describe many 
different types of political systems. Essentially, self-government arrangements 
grant Aboriginal people some degree of decision-making power in specifi ed areas. 
In Delgamuukw v. The Queen84 the Gitskan and Wet’suwet’en people claimed 
ownership and jurisdiction, including self-government, over a territory in central 
British Columbia. In dissent, British Columbia Court of Appeal Justice Lambert 
articulated the plaintiffs’ claim for self-government as a claim for a “right of self-
regulation of themselves and their institutions.”85
Self-government is critical to Aboriginal culture. The plaintiffs in Delgamuukw 
argued that self-government is necessary “in order to determine their development 
and safeguard their integrity as Aboriginal peoples” and “to preserve and enhance 
their social, political, cultural, linguistic, and spiritual identity.”86 Since contact, 
Aboriginal communities have done everything humanly possible to maintain the 
integrity and vitality of their own traditions, languages, ceremonies, and other 
authoritative internal arrangements, and to continue fulfi lling their ancestral obli-
gations to one another and the rest of creation,87 despite immense changes to their 
physical and economic circumstances, and pressures from non-Aboriginal institu-
tions.88 Arguably, ensuring high water quality is necessary to preserve Aboriginal 
traditions and customs, as well as to preserve the health and well-being of the 
communities themselves. This, combined with the fact that the current federal 
policy on drinking water quality on reserves lacks a suffi cient regulatory regime, 
makes it clear why First Nation governments would fi nd a right to govern water 
quality preferable.
If First Nations were able to prove an Aboriginal right to self-governance, then 
this right would receive protection through s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. 
This section reads:
35. (1) The existing Aboriginal and treaty rights of Aboriginal peoples of Canada are 
hereby recognized and affi rmed.
However, as case law has demonstrated, proving an Aboriginal right to self-gover-
nance is not an easy right to prove.  Courts have yet to articulate a clear statement 
on the legal status of the right to self-government, let alone on the scope of the 
right and its relationship to federal and provincial laws.89
R. v. Van der Peet90 sets out the test for determining the practices, customs, 
and traditions which fall within s. 35(1) and, as such, provide the legal standard 
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against which a claim to regulate water quality as a part of self-government must 
be measured. In Van der Peet, the test for identifying Aboriginal rights was said 
to be as follows: “… in order to be an Aboriginal right an activity must be an 
element of a practice, custom, or tradition integral to the distinctive culture of the 
Aboriginal group claiming the right.”91 In applying this test, the court must fi rst 
identify the exact nature of the activity claimed to be a right, and must then go on 
to determine whether, on the evidence presented to the trial judge, and on the facts 
as found by the trial judge, that the activity could be said to be “a defi ning feature 
of the culture in question” prior to contact with Europeans.92 
In turning to the fi rst part of Van der Peet, the court held that:
To characterize an applicant’s claim correctly, a court should consider such factors as the 
nature of the action which the applicant is claiming was done pursuant to an Aboriginal 
right, the nature of the governmental regulation, statute or action being impugned, and 
the practice, custom or tradition being relied upon to establish the right.93
In R. v. Pamajewon94 the court considered whether the right to self-government 
falls within the scope of the Aboriginal rights recognized and affi rmed by s. 35(1) 
of the Constitution Act, 1982. In making its decision, the court assumed, without 
deciding, that s. 35(1) encompasses claims to Aboriginal self-government; 
however, the applicable legal standard is that laid out in Van der Peet. Speaking 
for the court, Lamer, C.J. stated:
Assuming s. 35(1) encompasses claims to Aboriginal self-government, such claims must 
be considered in light of the purposes underlying that provision and must, therefore, be 
considered against the test derived from consideration of those purposes. This is the test 
laid out in Van der Peet. In so far as they can be made under s. 35(1), claims to self-
government are no difference from other claims to the enjoyment of Aboriginal rights 
and must, as such, be measured against the same standard.95
The court found that to recognize “a broad right to manage the use of their 
reserve lands” would be to cast the court’s inquiry at a level of excessive gener-
ality.96 Therefore, the right to self-government must be looked at in light of the 
specifi c history and culture of the Aboriginal group claiming the right.97 The right 
to self-government, according to the test laid out in Van der Peet, must be consid-
ered at the appropriate level of specifi city.98
According to these tests, the correct characterization of the right put forward 
is that of a right to regulate water quality as part of self-government. Therefore, 
individuals and First Nations’ government advocating for recognition of this right 
must fi rst prove that the practice of managing water quality was exercised prior to 
the contact. Though little physical evidence is likely to exist to demonstrate this 
fact, oral histories and the “common law” practices of these groups could be used 
to demonstrate that this right existed, and that it was exercised prior to European 
contact. However, under the tests enunciated in these cases, First Nations must 
also prove that regulating water quality was integral to their distinctive cultures. 
As previously stated, water is the lifeblood for many of these communities. It is 
used to not only meet physical needs, but cultural and sacred needs as well. Many 
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Aboriginal villages were traditionally located on waterways, and this resource 
was depended upon for food, household needs, travel, and ceremonial practices. 
Arguably, ensuring water quality was “integral to the distinctive culture(s)” of 
these Aboriginal groups and should be found “worthy” to merit the constitutional 
protection of s. 35(1).
Even if courts were to recognize an Aboriginal right to regulate water quality, 
this will not necessarily solve all the issues outlined in the fi rst part of this paper. 
As this paper has demonstrated, one of the major issues affecting water quality 
on First Nation reserves is capacity building. Even if First Nations were to gain 
ownership and control of this resource, this in itself, would not be enough to 
solve this problem. In fact, some may even argue that this change in ownership 
and jurisdiction would do more to reduce capacity building than develop it. Some 
critics of Aboriginal self-governance argue that Aboriginal communities have too 
few members with suffi cient leadership skills, technical expertise, or practical 
experience to meet the collective’s needs in these highly complex and diffi cult 
circumstances.99 
However, aggregation could be used by First Nations to help improve and 
build capacity within their communities. The Royal Commission on Aboriginal 
Peoples (RCAP) commented extensively on this issue and argued that individ-
ual Aboriginal communities are too small to develop the necessary capacity to 
govern the many jurisdictions often contemplated by the negotiating parties.100 
RCAP recommended that these governance functions be carried out by Nations, 
rather than individual Aboriginal communities. However, RCAP’s Nation-based 
solution would represent a radical departure for a great majority of Aboriginal 
groups across the country. Thus, while sympathetic to the commission’s premise 
that the community may not represent the ideal governing building block for all 
jurisdictions, many involved in self-government negotiations are discussing other 
aggregation options.
One type of aggregation that could be used to more effectively govern water in 
Aboriginal communities is a two-tier level of aggregation. Two-tier aggregation 
involves a number of governments coming together and forming a second level, 
“regional” government to deal with those issues that are beyond the capacity of 
any of them to handle individually.101 In doing so, the participating governments 
aggregate a number of their governance structures, processes, and functions 
upwards to the newly formed body.102 The strength of the two-tier govern-
ment lies in the framework it provides for: a) local Aboriginal communities to 
work together to deliver services; b) the formalization of the political relation-
ships amongst local Aboriginal communities; and c) the establishment of a 
mechanism for joint decision-making.103 In looking at well-established, non-
Aboriginal two-tier aggregation models, it has been observed that, “the inherently 
fl exible, non-interventionist approach and the gradual expansion of activities in 
response to local decisions have resulted in a system that is accepted, practical, 
and functional.”104
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One must also consider the benefi t of a two-tier system, in that it could be 
structured to permit the assignment of operating responsibilities to one tier and 
regulatory responsibility to the other. Brian Crowley, president of the Atlantic 
Institute for Market Studies, a Halifax-based think tank, stated:
When the government is a supplier of a service, such as water, it tends to be a poor 
regulator of quality. Regulator and supplier often work in the same department, may 
belong to the same union, and are both responsible to the same elected offi cials—who 
want to avoid unpleasantness and confl ict. Problems are bushed up or ignored with a 
wink and a nod. Governments can be far more rigorous regulators when they are at arm’s 
length from the supplier.105
However, whether such delegation will be used with potable water, whether it 
would be sustainable given that delegated responsibilities can be withdrawn and 
whether a large Aboriginal body, such as a tribal council, is of suffi cient size and 
independence to exercise regulatory responsibilities is still unknown.106
Other potential weaknesses of this type of aggregation include that they are 
not easy to understand and therefore reduce accountability to citizens or member-
ship.107 This could pose an even greater disadvantage in Aboriginal communities 
where citizens, on average, have lower education levels, and where accountabil-
ity of government institutions is very important. Secondly, two-tier aggregation 
requires a lot of effort to ensure that there is good coordination among the various 
levels.108 As was previously mentioned, Aboriginal communities are already 
struggling with capacity and resource issues. Finally, these types of systems are 
costly to run109 and First Nation governments are often working from very limited 
funding arrangements.
Instead of a tiered governance structure, aggregation can take many other 
forms. A less “ambitious” form of aggregation, some may argue, is through special 
purpose bodies that have the following characteristics:
They usually focus on one area of public concern, such as education, 
policing and water etc.;
Unlike governments, they do not have the power to legislate;
Any powers they do have are established in legislation of some level of 
government; and 
The leadership of the body is not necessarily elected by citizens at 
large.110
These special purpose bodies could have legislated powers, or they could not. 
Those without any real powers tend to be advisory or advocacy in nature, and in 
many instances they provide services to governments.
It has been stated that “in the everyday world of Canadian municipal govern-
ment, especially in the rural areas of the smaller provinces, inter-municipal 
problems are not solved by establishing new tiers of government or by drasti-
cally altering municipal boundaries.”111 In fact, local governments have found 
•
•
•
•
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many advantages to using special purpose bodies to carry out their governance 
functions. For example, local governments can remain distinct and responsible 
for the things that they do best on their own. At the same time, they can join with 
other local governments to undertake the delivery of services that are better or 
more effi ciently done in concert. Protection service, such as fi re and ambulance, 
sewage and waste disposal, and planning services are examples of services most 
commonly delivered by joint agreements. However, this does not mean that 
potable water could not fi t within this realm as well. This service is greatly related 
to sewage and waste disposal. In many instances these agreements can provide 
an expanded level and variety of services to rural residents.112 Other reasons local 
governments fi nd this aggregation attractive are that they can save on costs by 
either sharing expensive services, or by obtaining volume discounts.113 Further-
more, “joint hiring practices allow small local governments to recruit and share 
professional and technical staff.”114
These advantages do not mean that this type of governance structure is not 
without its disadvantages. However, it has been stated that these types of agree-
ments are most effective in the provision of regional services in either of two 
situations: 1) they are effective in predominately rural areas where services are 
limited, and there is economic and demographic stability; or 2) they are effective 
where a second tier of government takes responsibility for them.115 Therefore, this 
might suggest that if Aboriginal governments were to gain jurisdiction and control 
over water, a combination of a two-tier government system and a special purpose 
body might be the most effective way to manage and regulate the resource.
Though recognizing a right to regulate water quality provides one potential 
solution for drinking water quality on reserves, it is not without its own set of 
potential obstacles and concerns. Currently, many Aboriginal communities do 
not have the capacity or fi nancial resources to effectively manage this resource. 
However, there are steps these communities could take to increase their capacity 
and resources to a higher level. One potential solution is aggregation. However, 
because benefi ts tend to be over-estimated and costs tend to be under-estimated,116 
this solution would have to be carefully studied before Aboriginal communities 
committed to it.
Conclusion
Currently, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Health Canada, and First Nations 
do not operate under a regulatory regime for drinking water as most provinces 
do. As this paper has demonstrated, there are also many weaknesses in program 
management in federal departments. As a result, when it comes to the safety of 
drinking water, residents of First Nations communities do not benefi t from a level 
of protection comparable with that of Canadians living off-reserve. This is not 
acceptable. Aboriginal Canadians, including Indigenous people living on “land 
reserved for Indians,” are residents of the country, and should be entitled to safe 
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drinking water on the same terms as those prevailing in other similarly placed 
communities.
Water and water quality has always played an integral role in the lives of 
Canada’s Aboriginal peoples. For many First Nations, water is a sacred element 
in their existence, and forms an important part of their understanding of who they 
are as a people. Based on these traditions, it is not inconceivable to consider that 
Aboriginal peoples in Canada could have a right to manage this resource, or at 
the very least a right to co-manage this resource. Though it would be naïve to 
believe that all the issues surrounding water quality in First Nation communities 
will simply disappear through a transfer or sharing of jurisdiction, it is not incon-
ceivable to think that because of their vested and personal interest in this resource, 
First Nation communities would be more willing to create regulatory structures to 
govern this vital resource. If such a transfer were to occur, arguably aggregation 
could prove to be a useful tool for these communities. 
Not all First Nations communities may wish to have jurisdiction over this 
resource, and, in reality, many may not be in a position to take over responsibil-
ity for safe drinking water in their communities. Co-management then offers a 
unique solution in which Aboriginal communities work together with government 
players to help ensure the provision of quality water in these communities. One 
thing is clear, however, if First Nation communities are to have quality drinking 
water—comparable to other mainstream Canadian communities—changes have 
to be made to the current government policy on safe drinking water. The creation 
of legislation and an adequate regulatory body must be a priority for all parties 
responsible for this resource. To deal with such a complex set of issues all major 
players and their political representatives will need to be involved. Only then can 
a policy be created which recognizes and addresses all the concerns of the parties 
involved—one that will ensure the provision of safe drinking water equally to all 
Canadians.
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